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The New Employment Contract?
Economists often assume markets set wages.  On the contrary, for most Americans,
employers set their wages within an internal labor market that is often only weakly associated with a
spot market.  A characterization of internal labor markets back in the 1960s and 1970s might be that
they provided an implicit employment contract that exchanged employees’ hard work for
employment security.  For lack of a better term, we refer to that arrangement as the “old employment
contract.”
During the last decade, the media have proclaimed the death of the old employment contract
and a new emphasis on flexibility and external, not internal, labor markets.  In fact, this
pronouncement is overstated, if not incorrect.  As Samuel Clemens remarked upon seeing his
obituary, “The news of my death is greatly exaggerated.”  Data do show that employment security
may be tempered.  However, while tenure is a bit shorter on average than it used to be, the declines
are modest for most groups of workers.
While past research has emphasized the length of jobs as a measure of the strength of internal
labor markets, it is also important to understand the evolution of complementary measures; the
divergence of pay in the internal and external labor markets.  In a forthcoming Upjohn Institute book
(Levine et al. 2002), we present an exhaustive study using five distinct sources of data, including a
unique data set with information on employers and employees in both the United States and Japan
and a new survey on fairness in employment.  We examined changes in internal labor markets,
company pay structures, and the employment contract.  Our conclusion is that, as far as the wage
setting process is concerned, there is very little confirmation of the existence of a “new employment
contract.”
The Old Contract
In the classic old employment contract, especially at large employers, wages were not
strongly responsive to the labor market.  Instead, each company had a distinctive company wage
level and pattern. The implications of these patterns were as follows: 
1. Large employers pay higher wages;
2. Large and small employers reward employee characteristics such as age and education
differently; 
3. Wage levels of large and small employers within a region are only weakly related;
4. Wage levels among large employers within a region have large and persistent
deviations from each other; 
5. The pattern of pay differentials inside an internal labor market often differ from those
in the external labor market; 
6. Large employers hire higher-skilled employees and those from demographic groups
managers preferred; and
7. Employees hold strong norms against almost any type of pay cuts. 
Our study finds that these implications are supported in the data from the 1960s to the mid
1980s.
Have Institutions and Wage Structures Weakened?  
The standard reading of recent business history suggests that the wage structures associated
with internal labor markets (as described by Doeringer and Piore in their1971 work) weakened
between 1980 and 1996 (e.g., Cappelli 1995).  If internal labor markets have declined, we should be
able to answer “yes” to all of the following questions.  Our analyses did not find this confirmation.
 
1. Did wage levels at large and small employers become similar?  Yes, but modestly. 
The wage gap paid apparently similar employees at large (over 1000 employees) and
small employers (under 100 employees) declined from 18 percent in 1979 to 14
percent in 1993.
2. Did the returns on education and tenure in large and small employers converge?  No.
3. Did the correlation between average wages in a local labor market and large company
wages rise?  No.  In neither the Current Population Survey (covering 1979 to 1993)
nor the Hay data set (1986 to 1992) did the correlation between average wages in a
local labor market and large company wages rise.
4. Did inequality across employers decline?  No.  The standard deviation of employer
wage effects remained near 11 percent in both the Cleveland Salary Survey (CSS) and
Hay data sets.  In addition, the persistence of employer wage effects remained similar
in the 1990s as in the early 1980s (CSS).
5. Did the distinctiveness of wage patterns within an employer decline?  No.  Among
large employers, the variability and persistence of distinctive internal wage structures
remained constant from the early 1980s to the 1990s (CSS).  Similarly, the
differentials large firms paid for more education, age, and other worker characteristics
did not come to resemble the differentials that small firms paid.  
6. Did sorting of employees decline?  Unclear.  In the Hay dataset, sorting of skills was
similar in 1986 and 1992.  In the Current Population Survey, with the exception of
race, differences in the characteristics of employees at large and small employers
either remained constant or converged substantially between 1979 and 1993.  In the
CSS, the correlation between an employers’ average wage (conditional on its
occupation mix) and the mean wage of entry-level occupations rose by an
economically meaningful amount. 
7. Have attitudes changed to be more accepting of the vagaries of the market?  No.  Our
study repeated questions about the fairness of pay cuts that were asked in a Canadian
study in Vancouver and Toronto in the mid 1980s (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
1986). When we surveyed workers in those two Canadian cities as well as in Silicon
Valley in the United States in 1997 and 1998, the acceptability of a pay cut was
almost identical. 
Implications for Theory 
Our results are surprisingly unsupportive of any single story about changes in wage structures
at large U.S. employers.  Human capital theorists posit a tight relationship between skills and wages. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that returns to human capital have risen, returns to measures of skill
such as education, tenure, mean occupational education, and Hay points rose in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Nevertheless, most of our results are inconsistent with human capital explanations for wage
differentials among employers (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Davis and Haltiwanger 1991).  In the
early period, controlling for skills did not systematically reduce the estimated wage gap between
high- and low-wage employers (Hay, CSS, U.S.A./ Japan).  Moreover, controlling for measures of
skills did little more (CSS) or nothing more (Hay) to undo the rising inequality among employers. 
High-wage employers remain high-wage employers even with very detailed controls.  These results
challenge all theories of wage determination.  
An important question motivating our work was whether rising wage inequality is related to
weakening internal labor markets.  Studies using longitudinal data on individuals conclude that rising
inequality appears to be due to job changes, not to rising pay variance within a career at a single
employer (Gottschalk and Moffit 1994).  Our study did not examine longitudinal data sources, but
consistent with the past research, we found no increase in variability within employers’ wage
structures over time, implying more is at risk when people change jobs. 
s far as the wage setting process is concerned, there is very little confirmation of the existence of a
“new employment contract.”
Our findings of unchanged wage-setting rigidities (on average) pose a puzzle for institutional
theories of these rigidities.  Most of the rigidities (employer wage effects, size-wage effects, etc.)
have historically been linked to unions and to product markets characterized by oligopolies,
regulation, and limited international competition.  The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed
a decline in all of these product-market rigidities, but without a corresponding decline in rigidities in
compensation outcomes examined here.  These findings suggest that fairness considerations and
other micro-level determinants of bargaining power and the payoff to efficiency wages may play a
relatively larger role in determining wage patterns and rigidities than many researchers previously
thought.
Implications for Managers 
The rhetoric of the new employment contract suggests that employers and employees now
accept external labor markets as the best way to organize employment.  Our survey results show that
employees’ norms toward pay cuts and layoffs remain consistent with the traditional employment
contract.  Moreover, companies’ pay policies, presumably in part reflecting this stability in norms, do
not appear vastly more flexible or market-oriented than in years past. 
For managers, our results suggest that traditional internal labor market policies such as
minimizing layoffs may still be useful in promoting high levels of skill and effort.  Moreover, when
layoffs are necessary, employees accept them more if they are due to external causes such as low
sales, if top executives share the pain, and if the firm provides notice and assistance. 
Implications for Public Policy
Employment-related policies in the United States have often been linked to the old
employment contract.  For example, the United States is the only industrialized nation in which an
employee’s pension and health insurance depend on his or her current employment relationship. 
Training decisions after college are largely determined by a worker’s current employer, with no
visible means of certifying to future employers what was learned on the job.  Affirmative action
policies have emphasized increasing employment of underrepresented groups in large employers,
based on the assumption that jobs at large employers have above-average career prospects. 
Unemployment insurance and protection from many other labor laws often do not apply to workers
with short-term or nonstandard relations with their employer.  
Does our argument that the new employment contract is not much different from the old
contract imply that changes in employment-related policies are moot?  Not at all.  While mobility and
flexibility have not shown marked increases, North American labor markets have always had high
mobility.  Thus, public policies based exclusively on the old model never fit the careers and lives of
many Americans.  For example, it never made sense for health insurance and pensions to have been
based on a model of lifetime employment at a single firm.  Instead, public policies should encourage
portability of pensions and health insurance.  Government connection to learning should never have
stopped after college; instead, the government should oversee a system of industry-designed
certifications for general skills.  
At the same time, the results in our study imply that labor market policy should not abandon
the focus on creating stable jobs.  While few employers can assure lifetime employment, most
employees still value the predictability and relationships that come from long-term employment. 
David I. Levine is an associate professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley.
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